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JUDICIAL RECUSAL: IT’S TIME TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK POST CAPERTON
Justice Robert L. Brown, Retired*
I. INTRODUCTION
On occasion, Arkansas judges have attended public rallies in support of
a particular cause or made a public statement in support of or in opposition
to a hotly debated issue. A problem arises when a judge has that particular
issue placed before him or her for a decision after the rally or public statement has occurred. Has that judge already prejudged the issue?
Closer to home, an Arkansas Circuit judge, Michael Maggio, pled
guilty to federal bribery in early 2015.1 The plea was based on substantial
campaign donations that Maggio admitted were a bribe to rule a certain way
on a remittitur motion in a nursing home case.2 Maggio reduced the jury
verdict by more than $4 Million.3 No motion suggesting recusal had been
filed before the plea was entered, but based on the campaign contributions
and Maggio’s plea, it appears one was warranted.
All of this comes on the heels of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.4 In
Caperton, the United States Supreme Court ruled that an appellate judge in
West Virginia, Justice Brent Benjamin, should recuse in a case where he
benefitted from enormous campaign contributions from the CEO of Massey
Coal Company in a matter pending before that justice’s court.5 Justice Benjamin refused to recuse, but ultimately the United States Supreme Court

* Robert L. Brown is a retired Associate Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court. He is
a graduate of the University of the South (B.A., 1963), Columbia University (M.A., 1965),
and the University of Virginia (J.D., 1968). He currently is Of Counsel with the law firm of
Friday, Eldridge & Clark. “I am indebted to my law clerk, Josh Turner, and to my administrative assistant, Courtney Grinder, for their extensive research and help in the preparation for
this essay.”
1. Gavin Lesnick, Ex-Circuit Judge Maggio Pleads Guilty to Federal Bribery Count,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Jan. 9, 2015, http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2015/jan/09/
ex-circuit-judge-maggio-pleads-guilty-federal-brib/; see also Benjamin Hardy & Max Brantley, Mike Maggio Pleads Guilty to Federal Bribery Charge, ARK. BLOG (Jan. 9, 2015, 1:34
PM), http://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2015/01/09/mike-maggio-pleads-gui
lty-to-federal-bribery-charge.
2. Lesnick, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
5. Id. at 872.
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required him to do so based on the plaintiff’s due process rights under the
United States Constitution.6
Justice Anthony Kennedy, however, in authoring the Caperton opinion,
went further and remarked that states are free to impose more rigorous
recusal standards for situations apart from what due process requires.7 The
American Bar Association and several states took it as an invitation from the
Court for the states to do exactly that.8
Looming large in the debate over when a judge should recuse is the
whole notion of public confidence in even-handed justice. No one wants a
judiciary where judges have been unduly influenced by factors outside of
the courtroom.9 In an age where exorbitant amounts of money are spent on
judicial campaigns and avenues for public comment by judicial candidates
and sitting judges are readily available, an effective recusal procedure is
vital to preserve public confidence in our judiciary.
This article will explore whether a change in Arkansas’s recusal rules
and procedures is needed to provide a neutral review of denied recusal decisions in order to enhance and preserve that public confidence.
II. ARKANSAS RECUSAL RULES AND PROCEDURES
Simply put, recusal is the removal of a judge, or the withdrawal from a
position of judging, often arising from a conflict of interest or appearance of
partiality.10 In Arkansas, certain rules and procedures govern recusal. Specifically, recusal in Arkansas is currently governed by rules and procedures
pertaining to disqualification, public statements, and campaign contributions. The following sections will discuss each scenario of recusal in turn,
beginning with disqualification.

6. Id. at 889–90.
7. Id. (“The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications. Congress and states . . . remain free to impose more rigorous standards . . . .”)
(quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986)).
8. See ABA H. Res. 105C (2014) (adopted); ADAM SKAGGS & ANDREW SILVER,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, PROMOTING FAIR AND IMPARTIAL COURTS THROUGH RECUSAL
REFORM 9–10 (2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/
Promoting_Fair_Courts_8.7.2011.pdf (listing nine states that have adopted rules addressing
money on the campaign trail: Arizona, California, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, New York,
Oklahoma, Utah, and Washington).
9. Brennan Center for Justice, Judicial Recusal Reform – Two Years After Caperton
(June 2, 2011), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/judicial-recusal-reform–two-yearsafter-caperton (discussing public polling and state reform efforts).
10. See, e.g., Recusal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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Disqualification11

In Arkansas, “a judge has the duty to hear cases unless there is a valid
reason to disqualify.”12 Moreover, a judge has traditionally retained the sole
discretion to determine when he or she should recuse from hearing a case.13
And yet, when a motion to recuse is filed alleging more than conclusory
allegations of bias supported by exhibits, affidavits, or depositions excerpts,
an evidentiary hearing is necessary.14
When a judge decides not to recuse, the recourse for an offended party
is limited. An emergency writ like prohibition or certiorari is not available
since the decision to recuse is discretionary with the trial judge and an adequate remedy by appeal is available.15
The bar for success in a recusal appeal is set very high. To prevail, the
wronged party must convince the appellate court that the trial judge abused
his or her discretion and was biased to boot, which are daunting standards to
meet.16 In addition, appellate courts in Arkansas presume impartiality on the
part of the trial judge.17
The Arkansas Constitution, Arkansas statutes, and the Arkansas Code
of Judicial Conduct help to determine when a judge must disqualify in a
case. The Arkansas Constitution states the traditional grounds for disqualification:
No Justice or Judge shall preside or participate in any case in which he or
she might be interested in the outcome, in which any party is related to
him or her by consanguinity or affinity within such degree as prescribed
by law, or in which he or she may have been counsel or have presided in
any inferior court.18

11. Despite the technical differences between recusal and disqualification, the author
will use the terms interchangeably. See ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11 cmt. 1.
12. Porter v. Ark. Dept. of HHS, 374 Ark. 177, 191, 286 S.W.3d 686, 697 (2008);
Perroni v. State, 358 Ark. 17, 186 S.W.3d 206 (2004).
13. Perroni, 358 Ark. at 24, 186 S.W.3d at 210.
14. See, e.g., Ferren v. USAA Ins. Co., 2015 Ark. App. 477, at 4, 469 S.W.3d 805, 807.
15. See generally Manila School Dist. No. 15 v. Wagner, 357 Ark. 20, 159 S.W.3d 285
(2004).
16. Id. at 3 (Appellant must demonstrate bias by a showing of objective bias or that there
has been a communication of bias). But see City of Rockport v. City of Malvern, 2010 Ark.
449, at 12, 374 S.W.3d 660, 667 (Brown, J., concurring) (questioning the majority’s conclusion that Arkansas case law and judicial canons require recusal only when there is an objective showing of bias or a communication of bias, and instead suggesting that economic entanglement between a party and the judge, or anything else that may give rise to an appearance of impropriety, may force a recusal).
17. Perroni, 358 Ark. at 24, 186 S.W.3d at 210.
18. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 12.
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The relevant Arkansas statute follows suit and provides essentially the same
benchmarks for disqualification.19
The Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, which under the Arkansas
Constitution is enforced by the Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability
Commission, expands on these standards and focuses on whether the judge’s
words or conduct would cause his or her impartiality to “reasonably be
questioned.”20 Embraced within the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct are
some of the same standards for disqualification found in the Arkansas Constitution and state law, such as close familial relationships and prior representation in the case.21 But, in addition, personal bias in favor of or against a
party or counsel is included as a ground for disqualification.22
B.

Public Statements

A judge’s public statements may result in his or her disqualification.
Rule 2.11 of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct addresses statements by
judges on public issues and mandates judicial disqualification when:
the judge, while a judge or judicial candidate, has made a public statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that
commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result or
rule in a particular way in the proceeding or controversy. 23

Supplementing Rule 2.11 is Rule 4.1 relating to political campaigns,
which reads judicial candidates “should consider the impact of their statements” on the perceptions of their impartiality before making such statements.24 The comment to Rule 4.1 adds: “Public comments may require the
judge to disqualify himself or herself when litigation involving those issues
come before the judge.”25
The constitutional viability of judicial conduct rules like Rule 4.1 has
been in doubt since 2002. That year the United States Supreme Court struck
down the State of Minnesota’s prohibition against a judge or judicial candidates announcing personal views on public issues during a judicial campaign.26 The rule was held by the Court to have violated the candidate’s freespeech rights under the First Amendment.27 Justice Antonin Scalia, who
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-214 (Repl. 2010).
ARK. CONST. amend. 64; ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3, 2.11.
ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11(A)(2), (6).
Id. r. 2.11 (A)(1).
Id. r. 2.11 (A)(5).
Id. r. 4.1 cmt. 13A.
Id.
See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
Id. at 788.
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wrote for the majority, was particularly bold and vivid in his pronouncement
that all judges have preconceived notions and opinions, the expression of
which should not be limited by a state’s judicial conduct rules.28 In Justice
Scalia’s view, such biases should not disqualify judges when those voiced
opinions are later litigated in a court of law.29
The current Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct rule (Rule 4.1) is different from its 2000 Minnesota counterpart in that it requires a judicial candidate merely to “consider” the impact of the judge’s announced views on
his or her role as judge rather than refrain from making the statements about
those views altogether.30 Additionally, the Comment 13A to Rule 4.1 references a motion to recuse as a remedy for a wronged litigant to use against
the judge.31
Arkansas jurisprudence is sparse on the point of when a judge’s prior
public comments suggest prejudgment of the issue at hand. In 2000, the Arkansas Supreme Court in Walls v. State held that a judge’s comments to a
television reporter disagreeing with the supreme court’s opinion reversing
and remanding a rape case for resentencing in his court did not require the
judge to recuse in the resentencing trial.32 More specifically, the court emphasized that appellant Walls had cited no authority that his due process
rights were violated by the judge’s failure to recuse.33
Though not precisely premised on due process grounds, five years later
the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that there was apparent bias when the
judge, sitting as the trier of fact, announced before the decision was rendered that a shareholder would prevail in his claim of breach of contract
against the corporation.34 The appearance of prejudging the case, the court
held, required recusal.35 Federal courts of appeal have held similarly when a
judge defends a certain position before the press in a pending case, prior to
the time the final decision is made, thus exhibiting, according to these
courts, a lack of impartiality.36

28. Id. at 777 (claiming that it is “virtually impossible” to find judges who do not have
preconceptions or opinions).
29. Id. at 778.
30. Compare ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT r. 4.1, with MINN. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon
5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000).
31. ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 13A.
32. Walls v. State, 341 Ark. 787, 792, 20 S.W.3d 322, 325 (2000).
33. Id. at 793, 20 S.W.3d at 325.
34. Riverside Marine Remanufactures, Inc. v. Booth, 93 Ark. App. 48, 53, 216 S.W.3d
611, 615 (2005).
35. Id. at 53, 216 S.W.3d at 615.
36. See, e.g., In re Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d 164, 171 (1st Cir. 2001); U.S. v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 411 (D.C. Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 995 (10th
Cir. 1993).
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Campaign Contributions

Judicial impartiality is perceived to be most at risk, however, when a
party or lawyer has recently made campaign contributions to the judge presiding over a case involving these contributors. The public clearly believes
that campaign contributions have some impact on a judge’s decision when a
campaign contributor appears before that judge. According to one survey,
71% of Americans fully believe this.37
It appears the public has a sound basis for such skepticism. In 2006, the
New York Times reported that on the average, 70% of the time justices on
the Ohio Supreme Court voted with their contributors in pending cases.38 In
the case of one justice, the percentage was 91%.39
The frankness of the affected justices was also disarming. Justice Paul
E. Pfeifer of the Ohio Supreme Court said: “I never felt so much like a
hooker down by the bus station in any race I’ve ever been in as I did in a
judicial race.”40 He added: “Everyone interested in contributing has a very
specific interest. . . . They mean to be buying a vote.”41
In other states, supreme court justices have made similar comments
about the impact of campaign contributions. Richard Neely, a retired chief
justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals admitted, “It’s pretty
hard in big-money races not to take care of your friends . . . . It’s very hard
not to dance with the one who brung you.”42 In a similar vein, Justice Otto
Kaus of the California Supreme Court said, regarding the effect of money
and politics on decision-making, “You cannot forget the fact that you have a
crocodile in your bathtub.”43
In light of the public perception and these corresponding judicial admissions, confidence in a fair and impartial judiciary is at risk so long as
elections requiring contributions, whether popular or retention elections, are
in use. It has become more and more evident in recent years that judicial

37. JUSTICE AT STAKE, MARCH 2004 SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS: AMERICANS SPEAK OUT ON
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2004), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/ZogbyPollFactSheet_
54663DAB970C6.pdf.
38. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/01judges.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Erwin Chemerinsky & James J. Sample, You Get the Judges You Pay For, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/18/opinion/18sample.html.
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elections require significant amounts of money,44 which can affect judicial
independence as has already been illustrated.
Rule 4.4 of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct attempts to confront
this problem. It provides that judicial candidates may establish campaign
committees to manage and conduct their campaigns, which includes soliciting and accepting contributions independent of the candidate within the time
frame specified in the Code and then disclosing those contributions as the
law requires.45 One comment to Rule 4.4 reads:
To reduce potential disqualification and to avoid the appearance of impropriety, judicial candidates should, as much as possible, not be aware
of those who have contributed to the campaign. 46

This comment may invoke a cynic’s smirk, because contributions are a matter of public record. They are filed in the Arkansas Secretary of State’s Office and are often published in the statewide newspaper as well.47
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court upheld the State of
Florida’s prohibition against judicial candidates personally soliciting campaign donations but did not go so far as to require a candidate’s complete
lack of awareness of who the contributors were.48 Specifically, the Court
said in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar Association that it was permissible for
judicial candidates under Florida law to thank their contributors for their
donations.49 While the Court subjected the Florida prohibition against direct
solicitation to a strict scrutiny analysis and examined whether the state had a
compelling state interest in such a prohibition, it distinguished a thank you
note to contributors and noted that Florida was not required to include that
in its prohibition.50
The reality is that today money is an even more insidious hazard to
public confidence in our judiciary. This is due in part to the Citizens United
v. FEC decision in 2010, where the Court permitted unlimited campaign
contributions by corporations and labor unions for the benefit of candidates,
including judicial candidates, as part of their free-speech rights.51 In the af44. See, e.g., Barbara Peck, Judicial Elections: Will They Destroy the Third Branch?,
THE OHIO STATE U. L. SCH. MAGAZINE (2008), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/all-rise/2008/05/
judicial-elections/; Henry Glass, Justice for Sale? More Money Flowing to Judicial Elections,
THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2014/
1102/Justice-for-sale-More-money-flowing-to-judicial-elections.
45. ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT r. 4.4.
46. Id. r. 4.4 cmt. 3A.
47. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-207 (2014).
48. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1669 (2015).
49. Id.
50. Id. The Court held that the prohibition against direct solicitation was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest of assuring integrity in the judiciary. Id. at 1671.
51. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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termath of Citizens United, private watchdog procedures to determine
whether judges have been the beneficiaries of substantial campaign contributions from either a litigant or a litigant’s counsel have increasingly become critical factors in protecting judicial impartiality and independence.52
Arkansas provides a bit of an anomaly in that its Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that judges should take pains not to know who their contributors
are and the amounts.53 Yet, at the same time, under Caperton and the Code
itself, it appears to be incumbent upon our elected judges to know the extent
of contributions for litigants and counsel appearing before them to address
bias and due process concerns.
The solution to this dilemma would be for parties and counsel suggesting recusal to detail contributions from opposing litigants and counsel in the
recusal motion for the targeted judge’s initial consideration. Nevertheless, in
light of Caperton, the recusal process itself needs clarification in many
states, including Arkansas.
III. STATE RECUSAL REFORMS POST-CAPERTON
Commentators today are quick to point to recusal as the primary mechanism for protecting judicial impartiality and for assuring public confidence
in its judiciary.54 Much of this is due to Justice Kennedy’s invitation to the
states in the Caperton decision.55
As already mentioned, in Caperton, one justice of the West Virginia
Supreme Court, Justice Brent Benjamin, had refused to recuse from an appeal involving Massey Coal Company, after his campaign received the benefit of more than $3 million from the CEO of that company.56 Using an objective standard and the Due Process Clause, the United States Supreme
Court found that there was a “serious, objective risk of actual bias” when
Justice Benjamin participated in the Massey Coal Company decision and he
must recuse.57 The Court emphasized that recusal was not left to Justice
Benjamin’s discretion, but under these “extreme facts,” the due process
52. See, e.g., The National Institute on Money in State Politics, which has as its mission
the promotion of “an accountable democracy by compiling comprehensive campaign-donor,
lobbyist, and other information from government disclosure agencies nationwide and making
it freely available at FollowTheMoney.org.”
53. ARK. CODE JUD. COND. r. 4.4 cmt. 3A.
54. See generally, Ben P. McGreevy, Heeding the Message: Procedural Recusal Reform
in Idaho After Caperton, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 699 (2010); Raymond J. McKoski, Disqualifying
Judges When Their Impartiality Might Reasonably Be Questioned, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 411
(2014); Charles R. Raley, Judicial Independence in the Age of Runaway Campaign Spending,
62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 175 (2011).
55. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 887–89 (2009).
56. Id. at 873–74.
57. Id. at 885–86.
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rights of Caperton were implicated.58 Section A will discuss the recusal rule
remedies employed by states post-Caperton. Section B will discuss the potential remedies in Arkansas.
A.

State Recusal Reforms

In the wake of Justice Kennedy’s suggestion that the individual states
adopt “more rigorous” recusal rules than the Due Process Clause requires,59
the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates in 2014 adopted a resolution urging the states to adopt (a) disqualification procedures which include prompt reviews should the challenged judge decline to recuse, and (b)
disclosure requirements for campaign contributions.60
With Caperton and the American Bar Association’s Resolution as catalysts, many states have now experimented with various recusal reforms such
as (a) a one-strike peremptory challenge to a sitting judge; (b) mandated
recusal for significant campaign contributions by a litigant or attorney; and
(c) a prompt, neutral review of a judge’s decision not to recuse.61
1.

One-Strike Preemptory Challenge to a Sitting Judge

Perhaps the most radical reform employed after Caperton is the onestrike peremptory challenge to a trial judge, where no stated cause for
recusal is necessary and where the targeted judge is required to recuse. Several states have adopted this procedure and have even provided for a second
challenge to the replacing judge for cause.62
The obvious disadvantages of the peremptory challenge are the potential for forum shopping and for artificial delays. A litigant can merely dispose of the assigned judge to buy time and with the hope of a more favorable judge as the replacement.
2.

Mandated Recusal for Substantial Campaign Contribution by a
Litigant or Attorney

A second innovation that has gained momentum after Caperton is a rebuttable presumption that a judge should recuse if a judge received a certain
58. Id. at 886–88.
59. Id. at 889.
60. ABA H. Res. 105C (2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administra
tive/house_of_delegates/resolutions/2014_hod_annual_meeting_105c.authcheckdam.pdf.
61. SKAGGS & SILVER, supra note 8, at 4–5, 9–10.
62. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (West 2006 to Supp. 2011); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 3-1-804 (2014); IDAHO CRIM. R. 25(a); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 40(d)(1); see generally
McKoski, supra note 54.
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sum of money as a campaign contribution from a litigant or litigant’s attorney in the immediately preceding judicial election. The State of Alabama is
one example.63 Alabama uses a percentage of total contributions as the
benchmark.64 In addition, Alabama requires that if a judge receives a “substantial” campaign contribution from a litigant or litigant’s attorney, close in
time to the litigation, that judge must recuse.65 Judges in Alabama must also
file a list of contributors and contributions before taking office.66
Not all contributions or knowledge of contributors should require
recusal, according to the United States Supreme Court.67 But, clearly, when
the contribution is substantial and close in time to the case to be heard, one
might reasonably question a judge’s impartiality.68
The disadvantages of a specific sum fixed by a state legislature requiring recusal, as in Alabama, are its arbitrariness and lack of flexibility as well
as separation-of-powers concerns. Additionally, apart from a fixed sum,
defining or delineating with specificity what constitutes a substantial contribution that could raise bias concerns is a Sisyphus-type task. Certainly, the
amount of contribution, proximity to a trial, personal stake in the outcome,
and the ratio of contribution at issue to total contributions would be factors,
as they were in Caperton.69 But, standing alone, what constitutes a “substantial” contribution as an objective standard is a vague and elusive concept
that is not particularly helpful to a judge’s recusal decision.
3.

Prompt, Neutral Review of Judge’s Decision Not to Recuse

The remedy that has the most traction in several states is a prompt review of a judge’s decision not to recuse by a neutral judge or court. That
review can take several forms.70 Texas, for example, requires that neutral
judges decide recusal motions.71 This comports with public opinion. According to a press release from Justice at Stake following a 2009 poll, 81% of the
public surveyed believed that targeted judges should not decide motions
petitioning them to recuse.72

63. ALA. CODE § 12-24-3(b) (2015); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.1 (West 2006
to Supp. 2011); MISS. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3E(2) (2002).
64. ALA. CODE § 12-24-3(b).
65. Id. § 12-24-2.
66. Id. § 12-24-3(a).
67. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1669 (2015).
68. ARK. CODE JUD. COND. r. 2.11 cmt. 4A.
69. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
70. SKAGGS & SILVER, supra note 8, at 4–5.
71. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(c) (West, Westlaw through 2011).
72. Press Release, Justice at Stake Campaign, Poll: Huge Majority Wants Firewall Between Judges, Election Backers (Feb. 22, 2009), http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/
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The State of Tennessee, however, provides for appellate review of denied-recusal decisions by its trial bench in its judicial conduct code.73 The
judge refusing to recuse, following a motion to do so accompanied by an
affidavit, must enter an order stating his or her reasons for not recusing and
any other pertinent information from the record for an immediate, interlocutory appeal to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, where that court will expedite and conduct a de novo review.74 Ultimate review by the Tennessee Supreme Court is available.
This immediate review has the beauty of avoiding self-regulation of the
recusal issue by the affected judge under a discretionary standard and, further, offers additional protection to the litigant by way of a fast and efficient
decision by a neutral court. Flooding the Tennessee Supreme Court with
recusal appeals, artificial delays, and forum shopping does not appear to be
a problem according to Tennessee Court of Appeals Judge Frank Clement.
Based on discussions with Judge Clement, Tennessee Judicial Conduct Rule
10B has worked well.75 He is a self-described “fan of the rule” and is not
aware of any dissatisfaction with it.76 Over the past three fiscal years, there
have been ten or less recusal appeals filed each fiscal year with a total of
three appeals resulting in reversal.77
B.

Recusal Reform in Arkansas

What is the remedy in Arkansas when a supreme court justice refuses
to recuse? There is no remedy, because recusal is discretionary and judges
are not required to provide reasons for refusing to recuse. This is essentially
the same procedure the United States Supreme Court employs. The State of
Michigan has experimented with a rule where the supreme court would hear
a justice’s denial of recusal on appeal and a majority of the court could demand a justice’s recusal under an appearance-of-impropriety standard.78 The
rule, however, has been criticized for enabling the majority to remove a duly

press_releases.cfm/poll_huge_majority_wants_firewall_between_judges_election_backers?
show=news&newsID=5677.
73. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 10B (West, Westlaw through 2015).
74. Id.
75. Telephone Interview with Honorable Frank Clement, Judge, Tennessee Court of
Appeals Judge (July 16, 2015).
76. Id.
77. Email from Tammy Hankins, Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts, (July
25, 2015).
78. See Press Release, Justice at Stake Campaign, JAS Lauds New Judicial Rules in
Michigan (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press_releases.cfm/
jas_lauds_new_judicial_rules_in_michigan?show=news&newsID=6249; Mich. Ct. R. 200.3
(West, Westlaw through 2015).
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elected justice from a case without a fair hearing.79 The procedure for removing a supreme court justice from a case in Arkansas, no doubt, would be
fraught with constitutional and policy considerations that are altogether different from the review of a trial judge’s denied-recusal decision by a neutral
court.
It would be prudent for the Arkansas Supreme Court to adopt a recusal
rule similar to Tennessee Judicial Conduct Rule 10B for its trial judges. A
neutral review of trial judges’ non-recusal decisions would protect litigants’
due process rights and avoid forum-shopping concerns that a one-strike peremptory challenge by a party presents. It would also offset the problems that
arise from a judge’s forced recusal for receiving a contribution of a certain
dollar amount. In many instances, the dollar amount should not be the sole
consideration, but other factors like proximity to trial, personal stake in the
outcome, and ratio of that contribution to total contributions should be considered and be part of the recusal decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Arkansas Supreme Court would do well to consider recusal rule
reform comparable to Tennessee Judicial Conduct Rule 10B for the trial
bench. Public confidence in an impartial judiciary and an effective recusal
procedure go hand in hand. Immediate reviews by a neutral tribunal like a
court of appeals would allay suspicions of bias and provide an objective
supplement to self-regulation by our judges. Moreover, such review of nonrecusal decisions would avoid the pitfalls of peremptory challenges to our
trial judges and forced recusal due to a certain contribution amount.
If an effective recusal process is indeed our best protection against the
public’s increasing fear of bias by our sitting judges, Arkansas should listen
to the admonition of Justice Kennedy in Caperton and the American Bar
Association and seek ways to enhance and improve our recusal procedures.
Using Rule 10B in Tennessee as a guide would be a good starting point.
Judges, litigants, attorneys, and the public at large would welcome this.
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